Existing studies have often failed to …nd positive impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms. We argue that the two e¤ects underpinning the impacts of horizontal FDI (i.e., the positive spillover e¤ect and the negative competition e¤ect) have di¤erent degrees of attenuation with geographic distance. As FDI is often distributed unevenly across space, studies that do not account for the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals are prone to obtain inconclusive results. Using annual surveys of China's manufacturing …rms for the period of 1998-2005, we formally account for the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals, and …nd that domestic …rms bene…t from the presence of foreign multinationals located nearby but su¤er from those located in more distant areas.
Introduction
Over the past few decades developing countries have removed restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and even adopted policies to attract FDI, with the belief that domestic …rms could bene…t from FDI. However, empirical studies have often failed to …nd any signi…cant impacts of FDI on domestic …rms in the same industries, or even worse uncovered some negative impacts of FDI.
1 Do domestic …rms really not bene…t from horizontal FDI? Under what circumstances do domestic …rms bene…t from horizontal FDI?
Indeed there are two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms as elucidated by Aitken and Harrison (1999) . On the one hand, domestic …rms could bene…t from nearby foreign multinationals through knowledge spillovers (such as imitation of technologies, management practices and market orientation), and labor pooling (such as recruitment of employees from those foreign multinationals). Such positive e¤ect is henceforth referred to as the spillover e¤ect. On the other hand, domestic …rms are expected to lose market shares to the more productive foreign multinationals, thereby su¤ering the negative competition e¤ect. As a result, the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms depend on which of these two e¤ects is more dominant.
It is important to note, however, that these two opposite e¤ects of FDI exhibit di¤erent degrees of attenuation with distance. The spillover e¤ect operates through knowledge spillovers and labor pooling, which are more likely to be captured by those domestic …rms located near foreign multinationals.
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In contrast, product markets are generally integrated within a country, and thus the competition e¤ect does not decrease substantially with distance. 3 1 Studies reporting negative impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms include Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) for Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic, Konings (2001) for Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, and Hu and Je¤erson (2002) for China. See Görg and Greenaway (2004) for a survey of this literature.
2 There is a large literature showing that knowledge spillovers are localized, e.g., Ja¤e, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) , Audretsch and Feldman (1996) , Anselin, Acs, and Varga (1997) , Audretsch (1998) , Rosenthal and Strange (2003), and Orlando (2004) . For a recent review of this literature, please see Audretsch and Feldman (2004) . Meanwhile, there are also studies showing that labor pooling is also localized, including Je¤erys (1954) , Mussa (1982) , Layard and Nickell (1987) , Van de Klundert (1991) , and Parai and Beladi (1997) .
3 Studies on price convergence within countries include Frankel and Rose (1996) , Parsley and Wei (1996) , Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2002) , O'Connell and Wei (2002) , Goldberg and Verboven (2005) , and Rogers (2009) . For a recent review of this literature, please see Taylor and Taylor (2004) .
As the positive spillover e¤ect is relatively more localized than the negative competition e¤ect, it is expected that domestic …rms bene…t from foreign multinationals of the same industries located nearby, but may su¤er from those located in more distant areas.
Take the following extreme case as an example. Suppose that all FDI activities in a country are located in one region but the majority of domestic …rms are far away from that region. In this case, the small numbers of domestic …rms located in the FDI region could bene…t from FDI as the positive spillover e¤ect may dominate the negative competition e¤ect. Whereas the majority of domestic …rms, located far away from the FDI region, could not enjoy any positive spillover e¤ect but still su¤er from the negative competition e¤ect. Thus one may …nd insigni…cant or even negative impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms, when all foreign multinationals are grouped together without accounting for their distance away from domestic …rms.
In this paper, we formally account for the distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals to disentangle the two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI, and investigate whether and when domestic …rms may bene…t from horizontal FDI.
Our study draws on surveys of manufacturing …rms in China for the period of 1998-2005. Since China adopted the open-door policy in 1978, it has attracted a huge amount of FDI. The realized FDI increased from a total of US$4.1 billion for the period of 1979-1984 to US$69.5 billion in 2006, making China the largest recipient of FDI in the world (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007) . Moreover, much of FDI in China has been concentrated in a few regions, particularly, the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007) .
It is also important to note that in China knowledge spillovers and labor pooling (which underpin the positive spillover e¤ect of horizontal FDI) are relatively more localized than the product market competition. For example, using China's provincial data, Jian (2008) shows that R&D spillovers are localized, and it has an obvious spatial attenuation e¤ect. Similar …ndings are reported by Wang, Ma, Weng, and Wang (2004) about the transmission of two ideas in public management across China from 1991 to 2000, and Ke (2009) about productivity gaining from geographical agglomeration using data of 617 Chinese cities in 2005. Meanwhile, due to the household registration system (Hukou in Chinese), migration restrictions are still strong and labor mobility remains di¢ cult in China, limiting the extent of labor pooling (Liu, 2005; Au and Henderson, 2006) . 4 In contrast, China's product market has been found to be increasingly integrated, despite the local protectionism unleashed by the gradual economic reform (Bai, Du, Tao, and Tong, 2004; Fan and Wei, 2006; Holz, 2009) . 5 The uneven distribution of FDI across China together with the relative localization of the spillover e¤ect versus the competition e¤ect o¤ers us an ideal setting to disentangle the two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms.
We start our investigation by using the same speci…cation as in Aitken and Harrison (1999) where the output of …rms in a 4-digit industry are regressed on the presence of foreign multinationals in the same 4-digit industry -FDI Sector (measured by foreign equity share averaged over all …rms in that 4-digit industry, weighted by each …rm's share in the industry's total employment), along with a set of inputs and control variables. We …nd that domestic …rms su¤er from the presence of foreign multinationals in the same industries, which reinforces the literature …ndings and casts further doubts on why developing countries such as China are so enthusiastic about attracting FDI.
As argued above, however, this result may not truly re ‡ect the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms because the distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals is not taken into account. Henceforth, for domestic …rms of each China's region, 6 we decompose the key explanatory variable -FDI Sector -into several variables based on the geographic distances between domestic …rms of this region and foreign multinationals. Speci…cally, there are FDI Sector 100km (foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of the same 4-digit industry located within 100 kilometers of these domestic …rms, weighted by …rms'employment shares), FDI Sector 800km (foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of the same 4-digit industry located between 101 and 800 kilometers of these domestic …rms, weighted by …rms' employment shares), FDI Sector 1500km (foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of the same 4-digit industry located between 801 and 1500 kilometers of these domestic …rms, weighted by …rms' employment shares), FDI Sector 2200km (foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of the same 4-digit industry located between 1501 and 2200 kilometers of these domestic …rms, 5 In principle, reverse engineering of products made by foreign multinationals could be achieved by domestic …rms located far away from the FDI regions. However, the e¤ective reverse engineering is expected to require an exchange of tacit knowledge and the poaching of professionals formerly working for the multinationals, which are more likely for domestic …rms located near the foreign multinationals. This is clearly demonstrated in a recently claimed case of reverse engineering of Foxconn's products and processes by BYD in China (see, Li, Lu, Tao, and Wei, 2009a and 2009b) . 6 Here region refers to 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities, and 5 minority autonomous regions in China.
weighted by …rms'employment shares), and FDI Sector 2200km+ (foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of the same 4-digit industry located beyond 2200 kilometers of these domestic …rms, weighted by …rms'employment shares). We …nd that domestic …rms bene…t from foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from foreign multinationals located in more distant areas. 7 Our …ndings remain robust when several technical concerns in empirical studies are taken care of, i.e., the simultaneity issue associated with the productivity estimation, the decomposition of FDI Sector by alternative geographic distances, the omitted variables issue, and the inclusion of vertical FDI linkages.
Our results show domestic …rms do not necessarily su¤er from horizontal FDI. One strategy for domestic …rms to enjoy positive impacts of horizontal FDI is to locate their …rms closer to the regions with a signi…cant presence of foreign multinationals (or Hold Your Enemies Closer).
Building upon Aitken and Harrison (1999) 's framework, this study sheds light on why previous studies have often failed to …nd any signi…cant or even obtained negative impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms. And it contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of accounting for the distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals in studying the impacts of horizontal FDI.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes data, and Section 3 presents our empirical …ndings. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data and Variables
Our data is from the annual surveys of manufacturing …rms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. These annual surveys cover all state-owned enterprises, and those non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of …ve million RMB (Chinese currency) or more.
7 Aitken and Harrison (1999) also investigate whether domestic …rms may bene…t from foreign multinationals located nearby (i.e., local spillovers). Instead of decomposing FDI Sector by distance, they decompose it into two parts, one is the FDI Sector of the same region and the other is the FDI Sector of other regions. Interestingly they …nd that horizontal FDI has positive, albeit statistically insigni…cant, impacts on domestic …rms located in the same region.
8 There are other attempts to uncover positive impacts of FDI, such as vertical linkage of industries (e.g., Javorcik, 2004; and Blalock and Gertler, 2008) , absorptive capacity of domestic …rms (e.g., Kokko, 1994; Glass and Saggi, 1998; and Deng and Je¤erson, 2008) , productivity growth (Liu, 2008) , and spillover through wage and export (e.g., Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996; and Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison, 1997) .
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The number of …rms covered in the surveys varies from approximately 162,000 to approximately 270,000.
For our study, we need precise location and industry information of our sample …rms. During the sample period, administrative boundaries in China and consequently its county, city or even region codes have experienced some changes. Meanwhile, in 2003, a new classi…cation system for industry codes was adopted in China to replace the old classi…cation system that had been used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve consistency in the whole sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , we convert the region codes and industry codes of all …rms to those of year 1998. For the details of adjustment, see Lu and Tao (2009) .
Note that in recent years, there are more and more companies in China having plants located in regions other than their domiciles. However, according to Article 14 of Company Law of the People's Republic of China, for a company to set up such a plant, "it shall …le a registration application with the company registration authority, and shall obtain the business license." For example, Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co., Ltd. has six plants, located respectively in Jizhong (Hebei Province), Youyu (Shanxi Province), Luzhong (Shandong Province), Qiqihar (Heilongjiang Province), Chengdu (Sichuan Province), and Yanbian (Jilin Province); our data set accordingly counts them as six di¤erent observations belonging to six di¤erent regions. Thus …rms in our data set are essentially plants. Table 1 shows the distribution of foreign multinationals across China's regions in 2005. It is clear that FDI is concentrated in a few regions in China, with Guangdong having the highest percentage of foreign multinationals (25.4%), followed by Jiangsu (12.49%), Zhejiang (12.2%), Shanghai (11.79%), and Fujian (10.77%). The two engines of China's economic growth, Pearl River Delta (Guangdong) and Yangtze River Delta (Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai), account for over 60% of foreign multinationals operating in China.
The key explanatory variable in our study measures the presence of foreign multinationals in a 4-digit industry. It is de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms in the 4-digit industry, weighted by each …rm's share in the industry's total employment, and denoted by F DI_Sector it . Speci…-cally, it takes the following form:
where F DI_F irm f t is the foreign equity share in …rm f of industry i at time t; Employment f t is the employment of …rm f ; it is the set of all …rms in industry i at time t.
To disentangle the two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI, we formally account for the distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals, and decompose F DI_Sector it into several variables corresponding to di¤erent geographic distances between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals. Speci…cally, for …rms of industry i and region r at time t, there are F DI_Sector 100km;irt (de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of industry i at time t located in regions whose capital cities are within 100 kilometers of region r's capital city, weighted by …rms'employment shares), F DI_Sector 800km;irt (de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of industry i at time t located in regions whose capital cities are between 101 kilometers and 800 kilometers of region r's capital city, weighted by …rms' employment shares), F DI_Sector 1500km;irt (de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of industry i at time t located in regions whose capital cities are between 801 kilometers and 1500 kilometers of region r's capital city, weighted by …rms'employment shares), F DI_Sector 2200km;irt (de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of industry i at time t located in regions whose capital cities are between 1501 kilometers and 2200 kilometers of region r's capital city, weighted by …rms' employment shares), and …nally F DI_Sector 2200km+;irt (de…ned as foreign equity share averaged over all …rms of industry i at time t located in regions whose capital cities are beyond 2200 kilometers of region r's capital city, weighted by …rms'employment shares.
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Summary statistics of key variables is presented in Table 2 .
3 Empirical Analysis
Main Results
To investigate the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms, we use Aitken and Harrison (1999) 's speci…cation as our benchmark speci…cation. Speci…-cally, we estimate the following equation:
where Y f t is the logarithm of output of …rm f of industry i and region r at time t; F DI_F irm f t is the foreign equity share in …rm f ; F DI_Sector it is foreign equity share averaged over all …rms in industry i at time t, weighted by each …rm's share in the industry's total employment; X 0 f t is a set of inputs (i.e.,intermediate inputs, capital, and labor); Z 0 f t is a set of control variables (i.e., industry, region, and year dummies); and " is the error term.
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To account for the possible heteroskedasticity problem, the White-robust standard error is used.
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Regression results are shown in Column 1 of Table 3 . It is found that a …rm's productivity increases with the foreign equity share in the …rm but decreases with the presence of foreign multinationals in the same 4-digit industry. In Column 2, an interaction term between F DI_F irm f t and F DI_Sector it is included to account for the possible di¤erences in the impacts of horizontal FDI across …rms. It is found that …rms with higher foreign equity shares su¤er more from the presence of foreign multinationals in the same industry. The negative impacts of the presence of foreign multinationals in the same 4-digit industry on domestic …rms remains though it becomes statistically insigni…cant. These results are consistent with most of the literature …ndings using data sets from developing countries (e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Konings, 2001; Hu and Je¤erson, 2002) . And they cast further doubts on why developing countries such as China are so enthusiastic about attracting FDI despite the negative impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms. However, the above empirical results obtained using speci…cation (1) could be biased or even misleading. This is because the two opposite effects underpinning the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms (i.e., the positive spillover e¤ect and the negative competition e¤ect) exhibit di¤erent degrees of attenuation with distance. Given that the positive spillover e¤ect is relatively more localized than the negative competition e¤ect, domestic …rms located closer to FDI regions may bene…t from foreign multinationals, whereas those located in distant areas may su¤er. Hence, estimation (1), which uses a single measure of foreign multinationals for all …rms in the same 4-digit industry, could not reveal the true impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms.
To disentangle the two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI, we replace F DI_Sector in speci…cation (1) by a series of F DI_Sector variables corresponding to di¤erent geographic distances between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals, i.e., F DI_Sector 100km;irt , F DI_Sector 800km;irt , F DI_Sector 1500km;irt , 10 We use the constant value of output (available from the dataset), and de ‡ate capital by the …xed-assets investment price index and intermediate inputs by the producer price index.
11 The regression results with standard errors clustered at the …rm level are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
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F DI_Sector 2200km;irt , and F DI_Sector 2200km+;irt . Speci…cally, we estimate the following equation:
Regression results are shown in Table 4 . Interestingly, it is found that F DI_Sector 100km;irt has a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, F DI_Sector 800km;irt has a negative yet statistically insigni…cant coe¢ cient, and the rest of the FDI sector variables have negative and statistically signi…-cant coe¢ cients. Meanwhile, in terms of magnitude, the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms …rst decrease, then increase, and …nally stabilize (see Figure 1 for details). These results suggest that domestic …rms bene…t from the presence of foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from those located in more distant areas.
The regression results of Table 4 also help us to understand why horizontal FDI, if not distance-decomposed, has negative impacts on domestic …rms. Note that the estimated coe¢ cient ( ) from speci…cation (1) (Column 1 of Table 3 ) is a weighted average of estimated coe¢ cients ( j ) from speci…cation (2) (Table 4), i.e., = X j j F DI_Sector j;irt F DI_Sector it where j 2 f100km; 800km; 1500km; 2200km; 2200km+g. is negative, because only 100km is positive and its magnitude is dominated by those of other j .
Alternatively, we can follow Amiti and Javorcik (2008) in using a distanceweighed F DI_Sector instead of decomposing F DI_Sector by distance. Speci…cally, for …rm f of industry i and region r at time t, its distanceweighed F DI_Sector d irt is:
where irt is the set of …rms located in the same region as …rm f does; ir 0 t is the set of …rms located in region r 0 6 = r; w r is the squared root of the area of region r; and w r 0 is the "Great Circle" straight-line distance between the capital city of region r and that of region r 0 . The estimation equation now becomes:
The essence of the distance-weighed F DI_Sector is to reduce the impacts of horizontal FDI located in distant areas but increase the impacts of horizontal FDI located nearby. As shown in Table 4 , domestic …rms bene…t from horizontal FDI located nearby but su¤er from horizontal FDI located in more distant areas. Thus, the estimated coe¢ cient of F DI_Sector
is expected to become less negative when compared with of Table 3 , or even positive if the distance weights are su¢ ciently large. Indeed, as shown in Table 5, the estimated coe¢ cient of F DI_Sector d irt is much less negative than that in Column 1 of Table 3 (where FDI Sector is neither distance-weighted nor distance-decomposed), and its magnitude actually becomes economically negligible.
Robustness Checks

Sub-sample of Domestic Firms
One may be concerned that the estimation results in Table 4 could be driven by the inclusion of foreign multinationals in the regression sample even though the foreign equity share is controlled for. To address this concern, we repeat the analysis by using a sub-sample of domestic …rms only (i.e., a …rm without any foreign equity share is de…ned as a domestic …rm). The regression results are shown in Table 6 . It is clear that the di¤erential impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms along the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals remain robust to this subsample.
Alternative Decompositions of FDI_Sector by Distance
We use two alternative decompositions of F DI_Sector by distance. Specifically, instead of using 700 kilometers as the increment of distance in Table 4 , we now experiment with 500 kilometers (i.e., F DI_Sector 100km;irt , F DI_Sector 600km;irt , F DI_Sector 1100km;irt , F DI_Sector 1600km;irt , F DI_Sector 2100km;irt , and F DI_Sector 2100km+;irt ) and 1000 kilometers (i.e., F DI_Sector 100km;irt , F DI_Sector 1100km;irt , F DI_Sector 2100km;irt , and F DI_Sector 2100km+;irt ) as two alternative increments of distance. Regression results are reported in Table 7 . It is clear that our main results remain robust to these alternative decompositions of horizontal FDI.
Alternative Measures of TFP
Speci…cation (2) is equivalent to the use of OLS-estimated productivity as the dependent variable. OLS estimation of productivity, however, may su¤er from the simultaneity problem, i.e., the inputs may correlate with the error term. To address this concern, we then use panel method and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's method to estimate productivity as robustness checks.
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Regression results using panel-estimated productivity and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's productivity are summarized in Table 8 . 13 It is clear that the di¤erential impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms along the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals remain robust to these two alternative measures of productivity.
Omitted Variables Issue
While the speci…cations used above are the standard ones in the literature, one may still be concerned about the potential omitted variables issue. To deal with this concern, we …rst use the …rm …xed e¤ect estimation as in Aitken and Harrison (1999) to account for all the time-invariant unobservables. Speci…cally, we estimate the following equation:
where f is the …rm …xed e¤ect. Regression results are shown in Table 9 . It is clear that our main results regarding the di¤erential impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms along the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals remain robust to this estimation speci…cation. 12 An alternative method for dealing with the simultaneity problem is Olley and Pakes method (1996) , which uses investment as a proxy for unobservable productivities. However, there is severe missing information on investment in our dataset. Therefore Olley and Pakes (1996) 's method is not economically e¢ cient in our case. 13 The estimated coe¢ cients for intermediate inputs, capital and labor are respectively 0.9085, 0.0198 and 0.0521 in the OLS estimation, 0.8719, 0.0268 and 0.0682 in the panel estimation, and 0.6606, 0.0323 and 0.0446 in the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's estimation. Indeed, consistent with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , the estimated coe¢ cient of the free variable (labor) in the OLS estimation is bigger than that in the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's estimation, whereas the estimated coe¢ cient of capital in the OLS estimation is smaller than that in the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's estimation. Second, we stepwisely control for a host of time-variant regional variables, such as electricity consumption (measured by the per capita electricity usage), average wage in manufacturing industries, land price (measured by the ratio of total output value of construction over ‡oor space completed), trade openness (measured by the ratio of imports and exports over GDP), and freight volume (measured by the ratio of freight ton-kilometers over GDP). Regression results are shown in Table 10 . Again our main results remain robust to the addition of these control variables. Meanwhile, the estimated coe¢ cients of these additional time-variant regional variables also make economic sense. For example, electricity consumption and freight volume, both of which re ‡ect the quality of regional infrastructural services, have positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients. Average wage in manufacturing industries also has a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, possibly due to geographic agglomeration and the pooling of high-skilled labor. Finally, trade openness, re ‡ecting both competitive pressure and market access, has a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient.
Vertical FDI Linkages
In a recent paper, Javorcik (2004) demonstrates the importance of upstream and downstream linkages as potential channels for FDI to have positive impacts on domestic …rms. To test the robustness of our main results, we …rst follow Javorcik (2004) to construct a …rm's upstream and downstream F DI_Sector. Speci…cally, for …rm f of industry i at time t, its downstream FDI_Sector is:
where ik is the ratio of industry i's output supplied to industry k compiled from the 1997 China Input-Output Table; 14 whereas its upstream FDI_Sector is:
where EX jt is …rm j's export at time t; Employment jt
is the size of employment in …rm j working for domestic market; and im is the ratio of inputs purchased by industry i from industry m. Then, we decompose these two 14 ik is calculated excluding products supplied for …nal consumption and imports of intermediate products. Table 11 . With respect to the focus of this study, we …nd that there are still di¤erential impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms along the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals. Meanwhile, the downstream FDI has generally positive impacts on domestic …rms, whereas the upstream FDI has no signi…cant e¤ects, which are consistent with the …ndings by Javorcik (2004) . Finally, we …nd di¤erential impacts of downstream FDI on domestic …rms, consistent with our main …ndings. In particular, domestic …rms bene…t from downstream foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from those located in more distant areas.
Discussion
Our econometric analysis shows that domestic …rms bene…t from the presence of foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from those located in more distant areas. In interpreting the result, one should bear in mind the possibility that foreign multinationals might choose to locate in regions where domestic …rms are highly productive. Indeed, we …nd that the impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms are much more positive in the regressions without the region dummies, suggesting some degree of self-selection by foreign multinationals, which is consistent with the literature …ndings (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) .
In general, the inclusion of industry and region dummies in our estimation regressions has partially addressed the self-selection issue as these dummies control for all the time-invariant unobserved industry and region characteristics. Meanwhile, in our robustness checks, we also use …rm …xed e¤ect regressions (which control for all the time-invariant unobserved characteristics), and regressions with the inclusion of a list of time-variant regional characteristics and the control for the vertical FDI linkages.
Historically, when China opened up its economy to foreign investors in 1978, it took a gradual reform approach by …rst allowing foreign multinationals to invest in the so-called special economic zones (Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai of Guandong province; Xiamen of Fujian province; and Hainan province). Note that these …ve areas were economically backward and far away from the centers of China's economy. For example, as our data reveal, before 1978, only 4 out of 12,174 domestic …rms were located in Shenzhen, 1 located in Zhuhai, 53 located in Shantou, 21 located in Xiamen, and 63 located in Hainan. The choice of these …ve special economic zones was strate-gic as the central government wanted to localize and minimize damages from any possible failures of the experiment. Nonetheless, in the ensuing thirty years of economic reform, these areas have become not only the clusters of foreign multinationals but also those of domestic …rms, indicating the appeal of horizontal FDI to domestic …rms.
Conclusion
Empirical studies using data sets from developing countries have often failed to …nd any signi…cant or even uncovered negative impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic …rms. This raises the puzzle of why governments in those countries have adopted policies to attract FDI and also why international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have such policy recommendations.
To uncover the reasons for the inconclusive empirical …ndings, it is important to note that the two opposite e¤ects (the positive spillover e¤ect and the negative competition e¤ect) underpinning the impacts of horizontal FDI exhibit di¤erent degrees of attenuation with distance, with the spillover e¤ect being relatively more localized than the competition e¤ect. Thus domestic …rms may bene…t from the presence of foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from those located in more distant areas. As FDI is often distributed unevenly in developing countries such as China, studies without accounting for the geographic distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals are prone to obtain inconclusive or even negative results regarding the impacts of horizontal FDI.
In this paper, using the annual surveys of manufacturing …rms in China for the period of 1998-2005, we formally account for the distance between domestic …rms and foreign multinationals to disentangle the two opposite e¤ects of horizontal FDI. We …nd that indeed domestic …rms bene…t from the presence of foreign multinationals located nearby, but su¤er from those located in more distant areas. Our results are robust to the sub-sample of domestic …rms, alternative measures of productivity, alternative decompositions of horizontal FDI by distance, control for omitted variables, and inclusion of vertical FDI linkages.
Our study shows that domestic …rms do not necessarily su¤er from horizontal FDI. One strategy for domestic …rms to enjoy positive impacts of horizontal FDI is by locating their …rms closer to the regions with a significant presence of foreign multinationals (or Hold Your Enemies Closer). In this way, they can maximize the positive spillover e¤ect so as to overcome the negative competition e¤ect. Note: *,**, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. White-robust standard errors of parameter estimates are in parentheses beneath these estimates. All regressions include input variables (i.e., logarithm of intermediate inputs, logarithm of capital, and logarithm of labor), but their results are not reported to save space. Note: *,**, and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. White-robust standard errors of parameter estimates are in parentheses beneath these estimates. 
